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California v. Brown: Against the
Antisympathy Instruction
"Judges, by long custom, become hardened in the business of condemning, and may sometimes pronounce sentences, which even
when legal, may be unnecessary. Jurors, less accustomed to the
cruel task, retain those feelings which sometimes plead against evidence in favor of humanity, and soften the rigor of penal laws." 1
On January 27, 1987, the United States Supreme Court took a step
toward limiting the discretion allowed the jury during the sentencing
phase of a death penalty trial. In California v. Brown,2 the Supreme
Court held that instruction 1.00 of California Jury Instructions, Criminal
(the antisympathy instruction)3 read to the jury during the penalty phase
of a capital punishment trial did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. That instruction cautioned the jurors "not [to] be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." 4
Until Brown, the Supreme Court consistently held that a jury must
be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence when deciding whether
to impose the death penalty.5 To the extent that the antisympathy instruction prevents jurors from considering sympathy as part of the defendant's mitigating evidence, the holding of Brown contradicts and
implicitly overrules precedent. The Brown court intended for the antisympathy instruction to limit juror sympathy during the penalty phase
of a capital case to feelings evoked by the evidence. However, a reasonable juror could easily misunderstand the instruction and conclude that
she should not allow any sympathy to influence her decision on the death
sentence. 6
This Comment analyzes the reasoning the Supreme Court used to
uphold the constitutionality of California's antisympathy instruction, discusses the strong line of conflicting precedent, and suggests an alternative
instruction. Part I sets forth the background and holding of Californiav.
Brown. Part II analyzes the antisympathy instruction and critiques the
1. NOAH WEBSTER, A Collection of Essays, no. XXIII, 291 (1789).
2.

107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).

3. Instruction 1.00, 1 California Jury Instructions, Criminal (4th ed.1979) [hereinafter

CALJIC].
4. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 838 (quoting CALJIC 1.00).
5. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
6. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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majority's holding on its constitutionality. Part III suggests an instruction which is less likely to confuse jurors or to lead them to disregard
sympathy entirely.
This Comment concludes that by preventing jurors from considering sympathy factors at the penalty phase of a capital punishment trial,
the Court contradicts its own precedent on the value and importance of
mitigating factors in a capital case. The antisympathy instruction confuses jurors who interpret the instruction as an admonition not to consider any sympathetic factors because they have a conflicting duty to
weigh all the mitigating factors presented by the defendant. The majority's conclusion that California jurors interpret the instruction as a direction to consider only the sympathy that is raised by the evidence
presented at trial presumes a complex and unlikely inferential leap on the
part of a reasonable juror.
I.

Facts and Procedural History

A California jury convicted Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr. of the
forcible rape and first degree murder of a fifteen-year-old girl.7 At the
sentencing phase of the trial, the state produced evidence of his 1977
conviction for the rape of another young girl.9 Defendant Brown introduced, as mitigating evidence, the testimony of several family members
regarding his peaceful nature. Brown also introduced the testimony of a
psychiatrist who explained that Brown's sexual dysfunction may have
contributed to his actions. Brown himself took the stand, expressed
shame for his actions, and asked the jury for mercy. The trial court instructed the jury that when determining Brown's penalty, they must consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.'" The
trial judge then read the antisympathy instruction, which directed the
jury that it "must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion
or public feeling."'" The jury
2
sentenced Albert Brown to death.1
The California Supreme Court reversed Brown's sentence on automatic appeal.'" The court held that the antisympathy instruction given
during the penalty phase of Brown's trial violated his eignth amendment
7. Id. at 838.
8. In California, the capital punishment trial is a bifurcated process. During the first
phase, a judge or jury determines the guilt or inmocence of the defendant. Only in the second
phase does the trier of fact consider the aggravating and mitigating factors presented in evidence and determine the sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1988).
9. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 838.
10. Id. at 839.
11. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 537, 709 P.2d 440, 452, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 649
(1985) (quoting CALJIC 1.00).
12. Id. at 521, 709 P.2d at 442, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6 (1977).

Summer 1988]
Summer 19881

CALIFORNI V. BROWN

CALIFORNIA V BROWN

right to have
the jury consider all the mitigating evidence he
14
introduced.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the federal government from imposing any cruel and unusual punishment.'I This prohibition also applies to the states. 6 A majority on the
United States Supreme Court has held that the infliction of the death
penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment, provided such penalty is not imposed in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner.17 To safeguard against an arbitrary and capricious imposition of capital
punishment, the Court has held that the Eighth Amendment, as it applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,'" requires that
the sentencing body in a capital case meet two basic requirements before
imposing a sentence of death. First, it must not act with unbridled discretion,' 9 and second, it must not fail to consider any mitigating factors
introduced by the defendant. 20
Given these broad limitations on the imposition of the death penalty, the California Supreme Court held that Brown's eighth amendment
rights were violated. The court stated that the "individualized sentencing concerns inherent in the Eighth Amendment" mandate that the jury,
when deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty, consider any
sympathy factor raised by the evidence.2 ' The court held that giving the
antisympathy instruction during the penalty phase of a capital trial is
error because the instruction denies the defendant "the right to have the
jury consider any 'sympathy factor' raised by the evidence when determining the appropriate penalty." 2 2
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the California court's decision and
held that Brown's rights had not been violated.2 3 The Court examined
the two eighth amendment juror prerequisites for imposition of the death
penalty, found that they had been met,2 4 and ruled that the death penalty
could be imposed.2"
14. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 536, 709 P.2d at 453, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
15. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
16. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
17. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
18. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
20. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
21. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 536, 709 P.2d 440, 453, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 649
(1985).
22. Id. at 537, 709 P.2d at 453, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 650 (citing People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d
858, 876, 671 P.2d 813, 824, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 320 (1983)).
23. California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837, 838 (1987).
24. Id. at 839.
25. Id.
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The majority's decision that the Eighth Amendment had not been
violated was rendered after three initial findings, all of which center on
juror interpretation of the antisympathy instruction. First, the majority
determined that the constitutional validity of the instruction depends on
a reasonable juror's interpretation of the instruction, rather than the California Supreme Court's interpretation.2 6
The majority's second point on juror interpretation was that the
California Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the instruction as
prohibiting any consideration of sympathetic factors.2 7 In contrast to the
California Supreme Court's view that the instruction prohibits all emotional responses, Chief Justice Rehnquist proposed that the antisympathy
instruction only prohibits jurors from basing their sentences on factors
not presented at trial and on emotions not rooted in the aggravating and
mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant.2 8 The instruction, the
Court concluded, limits jury sentencing determinations to record evidence, thus ensuring meaningful judicial review and enhancing the reliability of the sentencing process. 29
The majority's third point on juror interpretation of the antisympathy instruction was that the California Supreme Court improperly focused on the word "sympathy" in determining that the instruction
hindered the jury's consideration of the mitigating evidence presented by
Brown.3 0 The United States Supreme Court determined that the California Court's focus on "sympathy" led it to ignore the other factors prohibited by the Brown instruction: sentiment, conjecture, passion, prejudice,
public opinion, and public feeling.3 1 The Court concluded that since the
"instruction was given at the end of the penalty phase, only after respondent had produced thirteen witnesses in his favor," no juror would interpret the antisympathy instruction issued during Brown's trial in the
"hypertechnical manner" of the California Supreme Court.3 2
According to a majority of the Court, the two eighth amendment
requirements together ensure that imposition of the death penalty is constitutional. In her concurring opinion, however, Justice O'Connor noted
the tension between the two requirements.33 In her view, the issue in
Brown was whether an instruction, designed to ensure that jurors make
capital sentencing decisions on the basis of clear and objective standards,
not mere whim, violates the requirement that the sentencer consider any
26. Id. (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1985)).
27. Id. at 840.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 839-40.
31. Id. at 840.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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relevant evidence.3 4
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the Brown instruction alone did not violate the Eighth Amendment.3 5 She stated that "a
moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, and not an emotional
response to the mitigating evidence" is a valid basis for assessing the appropriateness of the death sentence.3 6 On that basis she agreed with the
majority's conclusion that the California antisympathy instruction is
constitutionally valid. However, Justice O'Connor also called attention
to the danger inherent in attempts to restrict jury consideration of mitigating evidence. A confusing instruction that "attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing," compounded by a prosecutor's statements
that the jury should "ignore the mitigating evidence about the respondent's background and character," might cause the jury to mistakenly
forgo "its obligation to consider all of the mitigating evidence introduced
by the respondent." 3 She concluded that, on remand, the California
Supreme Court should determine whether Brown's jury was adequately
informed of its duty to consider all the mitigating evidence introduced by
the defendant."8
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, and in part by Justice
Stevens, dissented from the Brown majority on several grounds. 3 9 His
dissent focused on defects in the antisympathy instruction that could lead
to misinterpretation by jurors. To demonstrate the impropriety and ambiguity of the Brown antisympathy instruction, Justice Brennan focused
on the language of the instruction, the manner in which it had been construed in California trials, and experience with other provisions of the
California sentencing procedure. 4 °
First, Justice Brennan dispensed with the three grounds on which
the majority based its holding. The majority focused on the language of
the instruction, and determined how a reasonable juror would interpret
the instruction.4 1 The dissent argued, however, that the California
Supreme Court is better able to determine how a reasonable juror in California would interpret the instruction than a United States Supreme
Court Justice, and that therefore the final interpretation should be left to
the state's highest court.42
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 841-42.
38. Id. at 842.
39. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The first part of Justice Brennan's dissent is based
on his belief that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens did not join in this part of the dissent.
40. Id. at 843.
41. Id. at 840.
42. "The facial language of the instruction, the manner in which it has been construed in
trials in California, and experience with other provisions of the state sentencing scheme all
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Justice Brennan also contested the majority's construction of the
modifier "mere" in the antisympathy instruction. While the majority
contended that "mere" would limit emotional responses considered in
sentencing determinations to those emotions produced by the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented,4 3 Justice Brennan noted that use
of the word "mere" is not sufficient to validate the instruction." The
instruction counsels the jury to avoid "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." 45 From this
syntax, Justice Brennan argues, a juror could conclude that the adjective
"mere" only modifies the word "sentiment" and not the other nouns
listed in the instruction.46 Justice Brennan further explains that inferring
that "mere" modifies every word thereafter is not appropriate because
the word "prejudice" is included in the list of factors. Applying "mere"
to "prejudice" would indicate that a juror who allowed prejudice to influence his deliberation would be acting within the bounds of the instruction
if her prejudice arose from the evidence presented.4' Since prejudice
should never enter into a jury's decision, the Court's implicit assumption
that "mere" modifies every word which follows, including both "sympathy" and "prejudice", produces an anomalous result. 48 Therefore, Justice Brennan asserted that the word "mere" is not sufficient to keep the
instruction within constitutionally permissible limits.4 9
Justice Brennan also challenged the Court's assumption that character and background evidence introduced by the defendant would be considered by the jury despite the antisympathy instruction. An "equally
likely" result would have the jury looking to the court for guidance when
considering evidence, and inferring from the issuance of the instruction
that the defendant went too far when presenting mitigating evidence.5 0
Justice Brennan's final rebuttal to the majority's interpretation of
the instruction addressed the Court's conclusion that "sympathy" and
the other factors listed are "no more than a catalog of the kind of factors
that could improperly influence a juror's decision to vote for or against
the death penalty." 5 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, held that
a reasonable juror would interpret the instruction "as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the
buttress California's interpretation of its own jury instructions." Id. at 843 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
43. Id. at 840.
44. Id. at 843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. CALTIC 1.00 (emphasis added).
46. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 844.
51. Id. (rebutting majority's interpretation at 840).
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evidence adduced during the penalty phase." 2 In contrast, Justice Brennan proposed that the instruction would lead a juror to believe that any
emotional response was inappropriate.5 3 Brennan resolved that the jury
would interpret the instruction as a directive to avoid considering any
mitigating factors that evoked sympathetic reactions favorable to the defendant. 4 The instruction, barring "several emotions in unqualified language," neither prepares the juror for, nor warns her of the inferential
leap in interpretation required to construe the instruction "as a directive
'55
that certain forms of emotion are permissible while others are not."
Justice Brennan's dissent next addressed the inconsistent interpreta-

tion of the instruction in other California trials. Justice Brennan contended not only that the instruction can be easily misunderstood by
jurors, but also that it can be misconstrued by the prosecutors in their
arguments to the jury.5 6 During Brown's trial, the prosecutor's closing
argument utilized the instruction to dissuade the jury from considering
the mitigating evidence presented by the defendant.5 7 Justice Brennan
directed the Court's attention to other California cases that illustrate the
tendency of prosecutors to interpret the instruction in a manner contrary
to the understanding ascribed to the reasonable juror by the majority.5 8
For Justice Brennan, these cases demonstrate that the antisympathy instruction often has at least two plausible interpretations, one of which
has the effect of "precluding consideration of precisely those factors of
character and background
this Court has decreed must be considered by
59

the sentencer."

52. Id. at 840.
53. Id. at 844 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 845-47.
57. In his dissent, Justice Brennan included the prosecutor's closing argument: Mr.
Brown's relatives "told us [the court and jury] what a good boy he was at the time of his youth
when they knew him. And he brought them gifts and that he cared for his siblings .... They
did not testify, ladies andgentlemen, regardingany of thefactors which relateto your decision in
this case. Their testimony here, ladies and gentlemen, I would suggest, was a blatant attempt
by the defense to inject personal feelings in the case, to make the defendant appear human, to
make you feel for the defendant, and although that is admirable in the context of an advocate
trying to do his job, you ladies andgentlemen must steel yourselves against those kinds offeelings in reachinga decision in this case. As the Judge will instruct you, you must not be swayed
by sympathy." Id. at 845 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at 846 (citing People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 56-57, 655 P.2d 279, 300, 188
Cal. Rptr. 77, 98 (1982); People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169,
182 (1985)); see also People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 879 n. 11, 671 P.2d 813, 826 n. 11, 196
Cal. Rptr. 309, 322 n. 11 (1985) (prosecutor informed jury that "sympathy was not one of the
mitigating factors which the law authorized it to consider").
59. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (holding that "[j]ust as the State may not by
statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider... any relevant mitigating evidence")).
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Justice Brennan then reviewed a second instruction, which the state
claimed would cure any constitutional deficiency in the antisympathy instruction. The majority did not reach an analysis of the second instruction because it held that only "[i]f the specific instruction fails
constitutional muster, [will] we then review the instructions as a whole to
see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law."'
Instruction 8.84.1, subsection (k) of California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC) advises the jury that they may consider "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is
not a legal excuse for the crime."'" Justice Brennan stated that the language of subsection (k) narrows the jury's focus to mitigating factors related to "the nature of the crime or the condition of the defendant at the
time it was committed." 62 Brennan pointed out that subsection (k) has
been consistently interpreted narrowly.6 3 A narrow interpretation of
subsection (k) would not cure the antisympathy instruction. Instead,
Justice Brennan insisted that since precedent has not shown that subsection (k) yields a broader consideration of the defendant's background or
character, the jury is limited to consideration of factors concerning the
circumstances of the crime itself. 4 Under Justice Brennan's analysis, if
the jurors do not consider all the defendant's mitigating evidence, any
capital punishment imposed is in violation of the defendant's eighth
amendment rights.6"
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that even if the Brown jury did
interpret subsection (k) broadly, they were probably confused by conflicting instructions.6 6 CALJIC 1.00, the antisympathy instruction, which
may be interpreted as instructing the jurors not to base their decision on
the factors listed, conflicts with a broad interpretation of CALJIC 8.84.1,
subsection (k), which allows jurors to consider "any other circumstances." 6 7 Justice Brennan noted that such a conflict is impermissible
under Francisv. Franklin:6 8 "Nothing in [the] specific sentences or in the
charge as a whole makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory
instructions carries more weight than the other. Language that merely
contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will
not suffice to absolve the infirmity."6 9
60. Id. at 839.
61. CALTJIC 8.84.1(k).
62. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 849-50.
66. Id. at 848-49.

67. CALJIC, 1.00, 8.84.1(k).
68. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
69. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Francis,471 U.S. at 322).
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Unconstitutionality of California's Antisympathy
Instruction

Possibility of Jury Misinterpretation Renders Instruction Invalid

In overruling the California Supreme Court, the majority in California v. Brown noted that the constitutionality of a jury instruction must be
assessed, first, in light of a reasonable juror's interpretation,7' and then, if
necessary, by examining the controverted parts in the context of the
whole instruction.7 1 The majority focused its constitutional inquiry on a
reasonable juror's understanding of the disputed instruction. The majority ultimately concluded that although sympathy was listed with several
impermissible factors, a reasonable juror would naturally assume that
she could consider only sympathetic evidence actually introduced in the
sentencing phase.72
This interpretation places a high level of confidence in jurors' ability
to reason. The majority assumes that the jury interpreted the instruction
in the same manner as the Supreme Court majority - as an admonishment to limit emotional responses to the aggravating and mitigating factors presented during the sentencing phase.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist
doubts jurors' capacity to perform the reasoning that this interpretation
would require,7 4 yet in Californiav. Brown he expected the jurors to comprehend the instruction in a way that requires "telepathic abilities."7 "
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not consider that trained criminal attorneys
often fail to consistently interpret the instruction at issue in Brown. As
several California cases illustrate, prosecutors themselves are frequently
confused by the antisympathy instruction. 76 Prosecutors, unlike most jurors, are familiar with the legal concepts involved in a capital case. Despite their training and knowledge, prosecutors have failed to interpret
"mere... sympathy" as the majority assumes a reasonable juror will. In
People v Robertson,77 the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence showing the defendant "didn't get the breaks in life" was irrelevant because it
70. Id. at 839 (citing Francis, 471 U.S. at 315-316).
71. See, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 528 (1979).
72. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 840.
73. Id.
74. In Sandstrom v. Montana, then Justice Rehnquist stated, "I continue to have doubts
as to whether this particular jury was so attentively attuned to the instructions of the trial
court that it divined the difference recognized by lawyers between 'infer' and 'presume'." 442
U.S. 510, 528 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. "The inclusion of 'sympathy' in an expansive list of impermissible emotions would
logically lead a juror to conclude that any response rooted in emotion was inappropriate,"
Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 844. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 845-846 (citing People v. Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1982); People v. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987);
People v. Walker, 41 Cal. 3d 116, 711 P.2d 465, 222 Cal. Rptr. 169, (1985)).
77. 33 Cal. 3d 21, 655 P.2d 279, 188 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982).
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amounted to "a sympathy factor that does not focus on the real issue, the
crime and person Andrew Robertson was at the time (the crime] was
committed. '78 Similarly, in People v. Gates,79 the prosecutor told the

jury,

"It's not a time to talk for mercy or forgiveness for Oscar Gates.
It's too late for that ....
The evidence that you received in the case,
that [sic] what you promised the judge you'd base your decision
on, because the time now is not for philosophy or religion, mercy
or forgiveness, sorry [sic] for the family, feelings of guilt on your
own part."'80
These two excerpts demonstrate that even legally trained minds interpret
the instruction differently than the Brown majority. The excerpts also
demonstrate that the majority's conclusion regarding a reasonable juror's
interpretation of the instruction is questionable. Finally, these excerpts
show that prosecutors have communicated their misinterpretation to the
jury.
The evidence that CALJIC instructions 1.00 and 8.84.1 are read differently by the majority, the dissent, and various prosecutors indicates
that even well-trained legal minds are unable to establish one reasonable
interpretation. In a capital case, it is especially important that the jury
have a clear understanding of the instruction as well as of their duty to
consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 8 1 In Jurek v.
Texas,8" the United States Supreme Court held that the jury must receive
clear instructions which "guid[e] and focu[s] the jury's objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and
the individual offender." 83
To illustrate the confusion in Brown, if a jury understood the Brown
instruction in the manner of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the jury would consider all the relevant mitigating evidence presented, and let only the sympathy invoked by that evidence affect their decision. 4 If, on the other
hand, a jury interpreted the instruction as Justice Brennan feared, it
would incorrectly interpret the instruction as a direction to preclude
from consideration any sympathetic response to the evidence presented.
In the latter case, the jury would disregard the defendant's mitigating
evidence regarding his background and character. The defendant's
eighth and fourteenth amendment rights would be violated, since the
78. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Robertson, 33 Cal. 3d at
56-57 n.22, 655 P.2d at 300 n.22, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 98 n.22).
79. 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 793 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987).
80. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1200,
743 P.2d at 322, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 687).
81. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1978).
82. 428 U.S. 262 (1978).
83. Id. at 274.
84. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 840.
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misinterpreted instruction would keep the jury from considering the evidence properly presented by the defendant."
If two constructions of a jury instruction are possible, and one of the
constructions is unconstitutional, the Court has said that the instruction
must be declared invalid.16 The Court in Sandstrom v. Montana 7 held
that it is irrelevant that jurors could have interpreted the instruction in a
lawful way, for it is not certain that they did so.8 8 Thus, even if the
instruction in Brown did not actually result in a violation of Brown's
eighth or fourteenth amendment rights, the instruction is invalid if an
unconstitutional construction is possible.8 9 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist's hypothesis of a reasonable juror's understanding of the instruction
is irrelevant if the Brown jury could have interpreted the instruction in an
unconstitutional manner.90
B. Procedural Safeguards in Capital Cases Rendered Ineffectual by
Instruction
The Court has recognized that the stakes in a capital punishment
case are different from those in other criminal cases. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted, "one of the principal reasons why death is different is
because it is irreversible.""' For this reason, the Court has consistently
been concerned with the fairness of capital-sentencing procedure. As
stated in Woodson v. North Carolina,9 2 a process which does not allow
consideration of the individual defendant and the circumstances of the
crime "excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of
death the possibility of compassionate or
mitigating factors stemming
93
from the diverse frailties of humankind.
Because of the finality of capital punishment, it is especially important for the jury to have an opportunity to consider all the mitigating
evidence before invoking the death penalty. 94 Consequently, the Court
has developed several procedural safeguards. One such safeguard is the
defendant's right to present mitigating evidence on his own behalf. A
plurality of the Court in Lockett v. Ohio95 concluded that a statute which
85. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
86. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 519 (1979).
87. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
88. Id. at 526.
89. Id.
90. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 842-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 323 (1976) (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
92. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
93. Id. at 304.
94. The Court in Woodson expressed its fear of a procedure that "treats all persons convicted of a designated offiense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."
Id.
95. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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"prevents a sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight" to relevant evidence proffered by the defendant for that
purpose "creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite
of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."'96 The Court pronounced such a risk "unacceptable and incompatible with the commands
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."9 7
Although these procedural safeguards appear to protect defendants'
rights in theory, in Brown their application yielded the opposite result.
Brown was granted the procedural guarantee of presenting mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of his trial. 98 This presentation consisted
of the testimony of thirteen character witnesses, which involved elements
of an appeal for sympathy.99 However, Brown was denied the effect of
the procedural safeguard because of the risk that the jury, mistakenly
believing that it could not consider sympathy in determining whether to
impose the death penalty, failed to consider the testimony of these witnesses. Thus, the defendant was effectively prevented from exercising his
eighth amendment right to present mitigating evidence on his behalf."°
C. Arbitrary Imposition of the Death Penalty Violates Defendants'
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all citizens equal protection under the laws. 10 1 This guarantee is
particularly important when the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is invoked and the death penalty is
imposed. The Court in Furnanv. Georgia' 0 2 recognized that since "the
basic theme of equal protection is implicit in 'cruel and unusual' punishments, a penalty ... should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is
administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily."' 1 3 To avoid the arbitrary
or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty, the Court has emphasized the need for consistent application of death penalty procedures.
The Supreme Court has noted the importance of mitigating evidence
in preserving the right to equal protection for defendants in capital cases.
The Court pointed out that if a jury is prevented from considering all of a
defendant's mitigating evidence, there is a risk that the death penalty will
96. Id. at 605.
97. Id.
98. Brown, 107 S.Ct. at 838-39.
99. Id. at 840.
100. Id. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. "No State shall... deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
102. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
103. Id. at 249 (citing Goldberg, Declaringthe Death Penalty Unconstitutional,83 HARV.
L. REv. 1773, 1790 (1969-70)).
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be imposed arbitrarily."°
The antisympathy instruction in Californiav. Brown is susceptible to
at least two interpretations.'1 5 These dual constructions subject capital
defendants to potentially disparate treatment. Although designed to
guide the jury in the sentencing decision, and thus minimize arbitrary
impositions of the death penalty, the instruction actually fosters an inequitable application of the death penalty by opening the door to different
jury interpretations." 6 A "freakish" and "wanton" application of the

death penalty would result if different juries supplied different interpretations to the instructions, and so considered different mitigating evidence

10 7
in different capital cases.

M .

Proposed Alternative Instruction

The antisympathy instruction could be misconstrued by a jury, resulting in a violation of the defendant's rights. In California v. Brown,
the violation could have been cured by remanding the case to the lower
court to determine if the instruction as written, together with the prosecutor's closing remarks, rendered its probable interpretation
unconstitutional. 108
However, to avoid similar problems in the future, some important
changes should be made to the antisympathy instruction. First, the language of the instruction should be clarified to correct its inherent contradiction. CALJIC instruction 1.00, the antisympathy instruction, is

contradictory when issued in conjunction with instruction 8.84.1.
CALIC 8.84.1 instructs the juror to consider each applicable factor that

is listed in the instruction and presented at trial."0 9 CALJIC 1.00 admonishes the jury not to rely on "mere sentiment, conjecture, [or] sympa104. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). As the Court stated in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976), "[a] process that accords no significance to relevant
facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense... treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."
105. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32, 43-49, 51-52.
106. In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Douglas stated, "we know
that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be
selectively applied, feeding the prejudice against the accused if he is poor and despised and
lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving
those who by social position may be in a more protected position." 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
107. In the words of Justice Stewart, "The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot
tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty
to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
108. Brown, 107 S. Ct. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. CALJIC 8.84.1.
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thy...."1 Thus the two instructions together tell the jury not to be
influenced by emotional factors, yet to give close consideration to all factors presented at trial. In Francis v. Franklin, the Court held that
"[l]anguage that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity." '
To
cure the constitutional defect the antisympathy instruction in Brown
could be rephrased as follows:
Although you must properly weigh and balance all the mitigating
and aggravating factors presented into evidence during the penalty
phase of this trial, as jurors you must not be swayed by mere sentiment or mere sympathy. That sentiment or sympathy which may
be considered by the jury must be raised by, but must not extend
beyond,. mitigating and aggravating evidence presented at trial.
Prejudice, passion, public opinion or feeling, or conjecture should
not be considered to any degree when determining whether to impose the death penalty or to grant a life sentence.
This revised instruction expressly limits the factors that the jury may
consider to those raised by the evidence actually presented at trial.
The instruction could be further refined by replacing "mere" with
"solely." Thus the instruction would read "as jurors you must not be
swayed solely by sentiment or sympathy." This change would ensure
that juries understand the instruction as a direction not to base their decisions entirely on sympathy or sentiment, rather than as a direction to
consider sympathy and sentiment to be of no consequence in their
deliberation.
Finally, the instruction should be accompanied by a revision of the
part of instruction 8.84.1 that conflicts with instruction 1 . 0 0 .112 This revision should explain how the jury must weigh and balance the evidence
of the mitigating and aggravating factors that evoke sympathetic responses. The instruction could be rewritten as follows:
The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does
not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an
imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of
them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value
you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are
permitted to consider, as long as you do not base your decision
solely on sympathy or sentiment.1 13
Jurors would then understand why they must consider such mitigating
factors 4 and the effect that their assessment of a particular factor would
11
have.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

CALIC 1.00.
Francis, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985).
See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
CALIC 8.84.1 (author's suggested additions emphasized).
Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir. 1983).
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If the jurors in Californiav. Brown had had an express authorization
to consider mitigating factors, accompanied by the antisympathy instruction as revised above, and a more detailed explanation of the purpose of
the mitigating and aggravating factors, the majority's conclusion that the
instruction was constitutional as interpreted would have been consistent
with Supreme Court precedent. The revised instruction would ensure
that jurors understand that the emotional responses evoked by mitigating
evidence are proper for their consideration, as long as they confine their
consideration to the mitigating evidence presented during the penalty
phase of the defendant's trial. The suggested changes would produce a
more equitable and consistant application of the death penalty.
IV.

Conclusion

The inherent tension between the two jury requirements of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments is especially significant in capital
punishment cases, particularily those involving jury instructions similar
to the one given in Brown. In cases of this type, it is especially important
to establish procedural safeguards that meet these requirements, permitting the jury to consider any mitigating factors presented by the defendant, 115 yet preventing the jury from acting with unbridled discretion.
Over the last two decades the Court has emphasized the uniqueness of
the death penalty, and, in order that the imposition of any penalty be fair
and consistent, the special need for individualized consideration of the
character and background of the defendant.
However, in Brown, the majority stepped back from this concern.
The majority's determination regarding a reasonable juror's interpretation of the antisympathy instruction requires jurors to interpret the instruction to mean that they should limit their consideration of the listed
factors to those factors presented in the mitigating and aggravating evidence during the penalty phase of the defendant's trial. If the jury actually does follow the majority's "reasonable juror interpretation," and if
such interpretation was the only interpretation possible, then imposition
of the death penalty following the instruction would be constitutional.
However, the instruction in Brown is unconstitutional because a reasonable juror could intrepret the instruction differently from the
Supreme Court majority. The dissent interpreted the instruction as an
admonishment to refrain from considering any emotional response at all.
If the jury were to follow this interpretation, then a defendant could be
sentenced to death without a full consideration of all relevant mitigating
evidence. Such a sentence is clearly unconstitutional in light of the pre115. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110
(1982).
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cedent regarding procedural safeguards for the constitutional imposition
of the death penalty.
The differing interpretations of the majority and the dissent demonstrate that the instruction could logically be interpreted in more than one
manner.1 16 The Court has established that if there is more than one logical interpretation of an instruction, and one of these interpretations is
unconstitutional, then the instruction cannot stand. Here, since the instruction as interpreted by Justice Brennan would lead to the unconstitutional imposition of the death penalty, the instruction cannot stand.
However, if the instruction were revised to provide a clearer understanding of the duty of the jury and an explanation of the manner of
consideration of the factors listed in CALJIC 1.00, then the death penalty could be more consistently and equitably imposed. When balancing
the right of the capital defendant to present mitigating evidence against
the interest of our penal system in consistent imposition of the death
penalty, it is necessary to prevent a possible imbalance by using instructions that are patently clear. To refuse to rephrase the instructions is to
encourage the pronouncement of sentences that, as Noah Webster predicted, "even when legal, may be unnecessary.""1 7
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